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Near-Rational Wage and 
Price Setting and the 
Long-Run Phillips Curve
OVER THIRTY YEARS ago, in his presidential address to the American Eco-
nomic Association, Milton Friedman asserted that in the long run the
Phillips curve was vertical at a natural rate of unemployment that could
be identified by the behavior of inflation.
1 Unemployment below the
natural rate would generate accelerating inflation, and unemployment
above it, accelerating deﬂation. Five years later the New Classical econo-
mists posed a further challenge to the stabilization orthodoxy of the day. In
their models with rational expectations, not only was monetary policy
unable to alter the long-term level of unemployment, it could not even con-
tribute to stabilization around the natural rate.
2 The New Keynesian
economics has shown that, even with rational expectations, small amounts
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characterizes macroeconomic modeling and informs policymaking. 
The familiar empirical counterpart to the theoretical natural rate is the
nonaccelerating-inflation rate of unemployment, or NAIRU. Phillips
curves embodying a NAIRU are estimated using lagged inflation as a
proxy for inflationary expectations. NAIRU models appear in most text-
books, and estimates of the NAIRU—which is assumed to be relatively
constant—are widely used by economic forecasters, policy analysts, and
policymakers. However, the inadequacy of such models has been demon-
strated forcefully in recent years, as low and stable rates of inflation have
coexisted with a wide range of unemployment rates. If there were a single,
relatively constant natural rate, we should have seen inflation slowing
significantly when unemployment was above that rate, and rising when it
was below. Instead, the inflation rate has remained fairly steady, with
annual inflation as measured by the urban consumer price index (CPI-U)
ranging from 1.6 to 3.0 percent since 1992, while the unemployment rate
has ranged from 6.8 to 3.9 percent. In this paper we present a model that
can accommodate relatively constant inﬂation over a wide range of unem-
ployment rates.
Another motivation is a recent ﬁnding by William Brainard and George
Perry.
4 Estimating a Phillips curve in which all the parameters are allowed
to vary over time, they find that the coefficient on the proxy for expected
inflation in the Phillips curve has changed considerably, while other
parameters of that model have been relatively constant. In particular,
Brainard and Perry found that the coefficient on expected inflation was
initially low in the 1950s and 1960s, grew in the 1970s, and has fallen
since then. The model we present can explain both why the coefﬁcient on
expected inflation might be expected to change over time and, to some
extent, the time pattern of changes observed by Brainard and Perry. 
Our paper also allows an interpretation of the findings of Robert King
and Mark Watson and of Ray Fair.
5 Both ﬁnd a long-run trade-off between
inflation and unemployment. In addition, King and Watson find that the
amount of inflation that must be tolerated to obtain a given reduction of
unemployment rose considerably after 1970. Our model allows a trade-off,
but only at low rates of inﬂation such as those that prevailed in the 1950s,
2 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2000
4. Brainard and Perry (2000).
5. King and Watson (1994); Fair (2000).
9573—02 BPEA Akerlo/Dickens/Per  7/21/00 10:18  Page 21960s, and 1990s. At higher rates of inflation, the trade-off is reduced, and
at high enough rates of inﬂation, it disappears. 
Much of the empirical controversy surrounding the relationship
between inflation and unemployment has focused on how people form
expectations. This may be neither the most important theoretical nor the
most important empirical issue. Instead, this paper suggests that it is not
how people form expectations but how they use them—and even whether
they use them at all—that is the issue. Economists typically assume that
economic agents make the best possible use of the information available to
them. But psychologists who study how people make decisions have a
different view. They see individuals as acting like intuitive scientists, who
base their decisions on simpliﬁed, abstract models.
6 However, these simple
intuitive models can be misleading; indeed, sometimes they are incorrect.
Psychologists have studied the use of these simplified abstractions, often
called mental frames or decision heuristics, and the mistakes that result
from them. Economists should not assume absence of cognitive error in
economic decisions, nor should they assume that their own models and
those of the public exactly coincide.
We propose that there are three important ways in which the treatment
of inflation by real-world economic agents diverges from the treatment
assumed in economic models. First, when inflation is low, a significant
number of people may ignore inflation when setting wages and prices.
Second, even when they take inﬂation into account, they may not treat it as
economists assume. In particular, we hypothesize that the informal use of
inflationary expectations in wage and price decisions leads to less than
complete projection of anticipated inflation, with consequences for the
aggregate relation between inflation and unemployment. Finally, we
believe that workers have a different view of inﬂation from that of trained
economists. Workers see inflation as increasing prices and reducing their
real earnings; they do not fully, if at all, appreciate that inﬂation increases
the nominal demand for their services. Thus they tend to view the nomi-
nal wage increases they receive at low rates of inﬂation as a sign that their
work is appreciated, and to be happier in their jobs as a result. They may
also be unaware of the extent to which inﬂation is increasing the pay avail-
able to them in alternative jobs. Even fully rational employers, who must
solve the typical efficiency wage problem, can exploit workers’misper-
George A. Akerlof, William T. Dickens, and George L. Perry 3
6. See Nisbett and Ross (1980).
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workers fully incorporated inﬂation into their mental frames.
If any of these three departures from the fully rational use of informa-
tion about inﬂation are important, then at low rates of inﬂation, prices and
wages will be set consistently lower relative to nominal aggregate demand
than they would be at zero inﬂation. As a result, operating the macroecon-
omy with a low but positive rate of inflation will permit a higher level of
employment to be sustained. We will show that at low rates of inﬂation the
behaviors that we posit, which depart from the fully rational decisions of
typical economic models, impose very small costs on those who practice
them. Because there may be subjective or objective costs associated with
fully rational behavior, or because implementing fully rational behavior
may require overcoming some perception threshold or behavioral inertia, it
is plausible that the costs of nonrational behavior may be too small to induce
rational behavior from all economic agents. However, if inﬂation increases,
the costs of being less than perfectly rational about it will also rise, and peo-
ple will switch their behavior to take inflation into full account. Thus,
although increasing inﬂation modestly above zero will permit lower unem-
ployment, there is a rate of inflation above which the sustainable unem-
ployment rate rises as more and more people adopt fully rational behavior.
This rate of inﬂation thus minimizes the sustainable rate of unemployment.
The remainder of the paper proceeds in three steps. First, we describe
departures from perfect rationality at low rates of inflation and present
some evidence that supports our view. Second, we formally derive our
model of near-rational wage and price setting, show that the costs of near
rationality are small, derive short- and long-run Phillips curves from the
model, and present a calibration exercise that shows that, even when only
a fraction of wages and prices are influenced by near-rational behavior,
there can still be substantial long-run gains in employment from moderate,
rather than very low or zero, inﬂation. Finally, we estimate the theoretical
model using postwar quarterly U.S. data. The results support the theoreti-
cal model and are surprisingly robust.
Near-Rational Behavior Toward Inﬂation
As noted above, psychologists who study decisionmaking approach it
differently from the way economists do. Psychologists have identified
4 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2000
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rationality. Here we describe three ways in which we suspect that behavior
toward inﬂation departs from the economist’s rational model.
First, psychologists suggest that decisionmakers, far from making the
best use of available information, readily ignore potentially relevant
considerations and discard potentially relevant information in order to
simplify their decision problems. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
have dubbed this behavior editing.
7When people “edit” decision problems,
they rule out less important considerations in order to concentrate on the
few factors that matter most. In this regard, real-world decisionmakers are
no different from academic economists when they construct models: unim-
portant factors are ignored in order to concentrate on important factors. A
related literature in the psychology of perception suggests that items must
reach a threshold of salience before they are even perceived.
8 Thus, when
inﬂation is low, it may be at most a marginal factor in wage and price deci-
sions, and decisionmakers may ignore it entirely.
9
We know of no strong evidence either for or against the view that some
wage and price setters ignore inflation,
10 but several before us have sug-
gested the occurrence of such behavior. For example, Otto Eckstein and
George A. Akerlof, William T. Dickens, and George L. Perry 5
7. Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Kunreuther (1978) has used the phenomenon of edit-
ing to explain why many people do not buy disaster insurance: very low probability events
are ignored in decisionmaking. His book (pp. 165–86) presents the results of experiments
that demonstrate the phenomenon of editing.
8. See Gleitman (1996).
9. The behavior of cost-of-living-adjustment (COLA) clauses is consistent with increas-
ing attention being paid to inflation at higher levels of inflation. As inflation rose in the
1970s and 1980s, coverage of union workers by COLAs in the United States increased. In
the late 1960s about one-quarter of workers involved in collective bargaining were covered
by COLA clauses, compared with about 60 percent for the inflationary decade from 1975
to 1985 (Hendricks and Kahn, 1985, pp. 36–37). As inflation fell in the late 1980s, the
fraction covered fell to 40 percent in 1990 (Holland, 1995, p. 176). Such inﬂation sensitiv-
ity of COLAs is consistent with our basic idea that wage and price setters tend to ignore
inﬂation in their wage and price setting when inﬂation is low, but tend to take it into account
as inflation rises. But this evidence has at least two other possible explanations. It is well
known (see Ball, Mankiw, and Romer, 1988, p. 56) that the variance of inflation increases
with its level. COLAs may increase at higher levels of inflation as insurance against this
variance. Furthermore, if at higher rates of inflation a greater fraction of inflation is due to
monetary rather than to real shocks, more contracts will be indexed at higher than at lower
rates of inﬂation (see Gray, 1978).
10. Direct attempts to assess the effects of forecast inﬂation on wage setting have ignored
the indirect effects of inﬂation through other information that will be correlated with inﬂa-
tion. Such information includes the wages and prices of competitive and complementary
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tion that inﬂationary expectations mattered more in determining inﬂation in
the 1970s than in the 1960s.
11 One major macroeconomics textbook
describes the postwar U.S. Phillips curve in terms of an early period of
low inflation, which was ignored by wage and price setters, and a later
period of high inflation, when the coefficient on the last period’s inflation
was close to one.
12 Two of the officials who over the past five years have
been most responsible for achieving the Federal Reserve’s goal of price sta-
bility have also suggested the possibility of inflation editing. Former Fed
Vice Chairman Alan Blinder, in company with coauthors, has theorized: 
A businessman who cannot keep infinite amounts of information in his head
may worry about a few important things and ignore the rest. And when nation-
wide inﬂation is low, it may be a good candidate for being ignored. Indeed, one
prominent deﬁnition of “price stability” is inﬂation so low that it ceases to be a
factor in inﬂuencing decisions.13
Senate testimony of Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan seems
also to suggest the view that, at low rates of inflation, economic agents
may simply ignore it: 
6 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2000
goods and factors. Thus the findings that wage and price setters seem to put little weight
on inflation (Blinder and others, 1998; Levine, 1993) are inconclusive. For this reason we
made our own attempt to solicit such information. We sent an e-mail questionnaire to ran-
domly selected members of the American Compensation Association asking them to rec-
ommend wage and salary increases in hypothetical situations varying by respondent in a
number of different dimensions. The respondents were given the type of information that
personnel executives typically use to make recommendations for wage and salary changes.
This information included the wage and salary increases of other firms in their labor mar-
ket over the past year, the desired relative wage and salary position of their firm, expected
wage and salary increases of other ﬁrms in their labor market for the next year, the increase
in the CPI, the difﬁculty of hiring and retention, and their ﬁrm’s expected net revenue growth
relative to that of its industry and relative to that of the economy as a whole. The mean of
expected wage increases by other firms in the sample was increased one-for-one with the
rate of inﬂation. The total effect of changes in inﬂation on wage and salary increases by indi-
vidual firms can be seen by regressing the recommended wage and salary increases on the
expected wage and salary increases of others and the CPI. The point estimate of the change
caused by a one-point change in the CPI in the wages of an individual firm, given that that
ﬁrm’s changes are representative of other ﬁrms facing the same increase in the CPI, is 0.738.
This estimate is obtained by dividing the coefficient on the CPI by one minus the coefficient
on the expected wage increases of other ﬁrms. Unfortunately, this estimate has a very high
standard error, and we cannot rule out the possibility that the impact of an increase in
expected CPI inflation on wage inflation would be one for one, but the point estimate is sug-
gestive of our view.
11. Eckstein and Brinner (1972).
12. Blanchard (1999, pp. 153–54).
13. Blinder and others (1998, p. 98). 
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ing their savings and investment decisions can safely ignore the possibility of
sustained, generalized price increases or decreases.14
Second, even when people do pay attention to inflation, they may not
use expectations in the way economists typically assume. If economic
agents used a formal procedure to make wage and price decisions, they
would first use available information to determine a desired real wage or
price change. They would then add in the amount of inﬂation they expect
between the time they are making the decision and some future time
during the period over which they expect the price or wage to be in effect.
But if they make the decisions intuitively, subjectively considering a num-
ber of factors simultaneously, including inflation, there is no reason to
expect that the decision will give the appropriate weight to inflation. One
decision heuristic, suggested to us by interviews with compensation
professionals, is that information on inflation may simply be averaged
along with other factors to arrive at a nominal wage or price increase.
This would mean that an increase in inflation would lead to the setting of
a higher wage or price, but the effect would be less than one for one. Thus,
less than complete weighting of inflation is the second departure from
full rationality that may influence the relationship between inflation and
unemployment.
In fact, textbooks for compensation professionals warn against using
the formal procedure that economists would imagine to be standard. For
example, George Milkovich and Jerry Newman discourage their readers
from granting automatic wage and salary increases, including increases for
the cost of living.15 Such automatic grants, these authors say, reduce the
funds available to reward employees for performance. Similar thoughts are
expressed in the handbook of the influential Hay Group of compensation
consultants, in which managers are advised to “avoid linking salary move-
ment to changes in the cost of living, because this creates entitlement and
reduces the amount of money available to differentiate for performance.”16
The third important departure from the hyperrational model comes from
the way workers perceive inflation. Robert Shiller has documented very
large differences between the intuitive models of inﬂation used by the lay
public, most of whom are wage and salary recipients, and the mental
George A. Akerlof, William T. Dickens, and George L. Perry 7
14. Greenspan (1988, p. 611).
15. Milkovich and Newman (1984).
16. Rock and Berger (1991, p. 556).
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17
Wage and salary earners systematically underestimate the effects of inﬂa-
tion on the wages that their employers will want to pay them, even in ques-
tionnaires where the effects of inflation are quite explicit, so that it is
highly unlikely that inﬂation is ignored. As a consequence, and especially
at moderate rates of inﬂation when real wages are not perceptibly eroded,
workers’job satisfaction may be enhanced by nominal wage increases
even if they fail to fully reﬂect inﬂation. 
There is considerable evidence for this sort of reaction on the part of
workers. Economists see inflation as induced by changes in the money
supply and thus as having a uniform effect on nominal wages and other
prices, so that inflation causes no change in real income. In his question-
naire study, Shiller has shown that, in contrast, the public has no such
expectations. For example, when asked “to imagine how things would be
different if the United States had experienced higher inflation over the
last five years,”
18 only 31 percent of his noneconomist subjects believed
that their own nominal income would have been higher than in the absence
of inflation. When asked “to evaluate [a variety] of theories about [how]
the effects of general inflation on wages and salary relates to your own
experience and your own job,” 60 percent of economists, but only 11 per-
cent of the general public, elected that “competition among employers will
cause my pay to be bid up. I could get outside offers from other employers,
and so, to keep me my employer will have to raise my pay too.” A popu-
lar answer for the general public (26 percent), in contrast to economists
(4 percent), was the following: “the price increase will create extra proﬁts
for my employer who can now sell output for more; there will be no effect
on my pay.”
19
These responses suggest that the public fails to understand inflation as
a general-equilibrium phenomenon. They believe that inflation will make
them poorer because it bids up the prices of the goods they consume, but
they fail to appreciate fully, if at all, that inﬂation will also bid up the prices
of other competing factors and other competing workers, thereby resulting
in a rise in their own wages and salaries. Thus, according to Shiller, the
“biggest gripe about inflation,” expressed by 77 percent of the general
8 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2000
17. Shiller (1997).
18. Shiller (1997, p. 21).
19. Shiller (1997, pp. 31–32).
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real buying power. It makes me poorer.”
20
Economists should not be surprised that laypeople underestimate the
effect of inflation on the demand for their own services. One of the most
significant differences between trained economists and the lay public is
economists’greater appreciation of general equilibrium. The cognitive
difficulty of general equilibrium has been indicated by the fact, noted by
the Commission on Graduate Education, that even economics graduate
students do not give the correct explanation for why barbers’wages, in
the technically stagnant hair-cutting industry, have risen over the past
century.
21 If economics graduate students fail to appreciate the effects on
barbers’opportunity costs from wage increases due to productivity change
outside the hair-cutting industry, it would be a stretch to expect the lay
public to see that, as inﬂation rises, the demand for their services (in nom-
inal dollars) will similarly rise with it.
Findings by Eldar Shafir, Peter Diamond, and Tversky are consistent
with those of Shiller. In one vignette, which they related to respondents,
these authors draw a contrast between Ann, who receives a 2 percent nom-
inal salary increase at zero inflation, and Barbara, who gets a 5 percent
nominal salary increase at 4 percent inﬂation. Most respondents correctly
answered that Ann would be better off economically,
22 but they also said
that Barbara would be happier and less likely to leave her job. This reac-
tion to the vignette suggests that respondents have not ignored the infla-
tion, as they would with editing—otherwise Ann would not be judged
better off economically. But the other answer, favoring Barbara, suggests
that they may also underestimate the effect that inﬂation will have on Bar-
bara’s other alternatives, thus leading them to conclude that she will be
happier and less likely to quit her job. 
Unfortunately, these authors did not probe the reasons why their respon-
dents believed Barbara should be happier than Ann, but they are respond-
ing as if the inflation has not increased Barbara’s alternatives by an equal
amount. If the wages that she could get on the outside, as well as all of
the prices that she would be paying, have increased by 4 percent, Barbara
should be less happy than Ann and more likely to leave her job. Our model
of inﬂation, however, suggests a good reason why Barbara should feel hap-
George A. Akerlof, William T. Dickens, and George L. Perry 9
20. Shiller (1997, p. 29).
21. Krueger and others (1991, p. 1044).
22. Shaﬁr, Diamond, and Tversky (1997).
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that her alternatives improve at the rate of inflation. Another question by
Shiller suggests that the responses obtained to this vignette reflect the
true opinion of the American public. He finds that about half of the U.S.
general public—but only 8 percent of economists—think that they would
feel more job satisfaction “if their pay went up . . . even if prices went up
as much.”
23
Neither the vignette by Shafir and others nor Shiller’s question deals
with the possibility, perhaps on the mind of the public, that the inflation
is caused by a supply shock that decreases the real demand for workers
rather than a money-neutral demand shock that leaves all demands
unchanged in real terms. Of course, if that is really what is on the mind of
the public, even when there is a persistent demand-induced increase in
the rate of inflation, workers will still have greater job satisfaction with
some small amount of inflation than with no inflation. This, then, is the
third way in which we think that near rationality may impact the relation
between inﬂation and unemployment. If higher job satisfaction at low rates
of inflation leads to higher morale, less shirking, higher productivity, and
less turnover, then ﬁrms face a different efﬁciency wage constraint at low
rates of inflation than they face at either zero inflation or at high rates of
inflation, when workers’ attitudes toward inflation may become more
rational. 
A Simple Model of Near-Rational Wage and Price Setting
We now present a simple formal model of the economy that incorpo-
rates the behavioral insights just described. In the model, some ﬁrms’wage
and price setters may ignore inflation, or firms may be aware of inflation
but use it as only one of several factors in setting wages and prices, thus
underweighting it relative to the behavior assumed in hyperrational
models. And workers themselves may ignore or underweight inflation
when considering their satisfaction at their current job, which in turn
would affect their productivity. The net effect on unit labor costs of this
behavior by workers may or may not be fully factored into ﬁrms’wage set-
ting. The implications of our model for the behavior of the macroeconomy
10 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2000
23. Shiller (1997, p. 37).
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consider the case where firms do not correctly anticipate the effects on
worker satisfaction and productivity, because this case permits a simple
derivation of the profit shortfall a firm experiences from less than fully
rational behavior.
The easiest place to begin the model is with its macroeconomic behav-
ior. Income is determined by the quantity theory equation
(1)
where Y is real income,  p   is the average price level in the economy, and M
is the money supply. The usual constant of such quantity theory equa-
tions has been normalized to one by the choice of units. 
The microeconomics of this economy begins with the boilerplate for
models with monopolistically competitive firms. There are n firms in this
economy. They divide up total aggregate demand, M/p  , according to the
relative prices for their respective goods, so that the demand for the out-
put of an individual ﬁrm is of the form
(2)
where p is the price charged by a ﬁrm for its own product. 
This takes us to the first innovation of the model, which occurs in the
formulation of productivity and its effect on wages. All of these ﬁrms will
pay an efﬁciency wage, which minimizes the unit labor cost of production.
Productivity (as well as turnover costs) in each firm depends upon the
morale of its workers. That morale, in turn, depends upon workers’con-
ception of their outside opportunities, which has two major determinants.
The ﬁrst is the rate of unemployment, which determines how easy it would
be for an individual worker to obtain another job. The higher the unem-
ployment rate, the lower will be the opportunity cost of workers, and there-
fore the higher the morale inside the firm. The second determinant of
morale is the workers’perception of the gap between their wage at their
own firm and the wage outside the firm. That perception depends upon
the wage being paid by the worker’s current firm and his or her reference
wage, which gives that worker’s perception of the wages of other work-
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tivity the following functional form:
(3)
where P denotes labor productivity, w is the wage paid by the firm, w
Ris
the reference wage of its workers, and u is the aggregate unemployment
rate.   is chosen in the range 0 <   < 1.
Firms set both prices and wages one period ahead. In so doing they pro-
ject the effects of inﬂation on the reference wages of their workers. These
reference wages, of course, determine the level of wages that a ﬁrm should
be paying. Totally rational ﬁrms will incorporate all of their expected inﬂa-
tion into the reference wage w
R. In contrast, near-rational ﬁrms—and simi-
larly, fully rational ﬁrms whose workers underweight inﬂation in w
R—will
incorporate only a fraction of inﬂation, a, into their projections of inﬂation.
When a is zero, inflation is totally ignored. In the intermediate range, 
0 < a < 1, it is merely underestimated. Thus the reference wage for fully
rational workers for the joint wage and price decisions of fully rational
ﬁrms is
(4)
where  w   –1 is the average wage paid to all workers in the previous period,
and π
e is the expected rate of price inflation. The reference wage for the
wage- and price-setting decision by near-rational firms, which are engag-
ing in cognitive error, will analogously be
(5)
Equation 5 also describes the reference wage for the near-rational
employees.
The proﬁt-maximizing choice of the price for both the rational and the
near-rational firms will take the following form. In both cases the prices
will be a markup over expected unit labor costs,
(6)
where j refers to both rational and near-rational ﬁrms, and P
e
j is the ﬁrms’
expected productivity. The markup factor m will be  /(  – 1). The rational
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ple of their respective reference wages, which will differ for rational and
for near-rational firms. The efficiency wage paid by each firm type will
minimize its respective unit labor costs, wj/Pj. Accordingly, each type of
ﬁrm will choose, respectively,
(7)
Near-rational ﬁrms set wages that are different from those of fully ratio-
nal firms, but the difference does not cumulate. The wages of near-rational
firms are reset relative to their reference wage in each and every period.
The reference wages for rational and near-rational ﬁrms are both multiples
of the last period’s average wage, and therefore both rise with steady
inflation and always stand in the ratio (1 + aπ
e)/(1 + π
e). As a result, the
difference between wages at the two types of ﬁrms will be small at low and
moderate levels of inﬂation.
The profits of each type of firm will be revenues net of labor costs.
Given the demand function for ﬁrms’product in equation 2 and their labor
productivity in equation 3, the proﬁts for the two types of ﬁrms will be
(8)
So far the model has described the case where the ﬁrm ignores or under-
weights inﬂation, and the case where the ﬁrm is rational but workers’ref-
erence wages are underindexed. Both situations will give us similar
Phillips curves. In one case, near-rational firms will be switching to true
rationality as their costs from near rationality mount with high inflation,
whereas in the other case workers will eventually curb their mispercep-
tions as inﬂation rises. But the two hypotheses are slightly different, and at
this point we shall take the alternative route that analyzes the model where
the near-rational firms fail to fully take account of inflation in forming
wR, but workers are always fully cognizant of inflation in determining 
their reference wage. This route permits an evaluation of the worst possi-
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age wage  w   –1 from equations 3 through 7, so it is possible to evaluate the
relative proﬁts of rational and near-rational ﬁrms. Using the proﬁt function
in equation 8, along with the assumption that both rational and near-
rational firms have correct expectations about inflation, yields a formula
for the relative profits of the two types of firms.
24 The relative increase in
proﬁts that a near-rational ﬁrm could make by becoming a rational ﬁrm is
given by the following loss function,
(9)
where rr and rnr are, respectively, the profits of rational and near-rational
ﬁrms and z is the ratio (1 + aπ)/(1 + π). Equation 9 has three implications
for this paper, which we shall explore in turn.
The first implication is that those who fail to maximize profits either
by ignoring inflation (a = 0) or by taking it into account only partially 
(0 < a < 1) are near rational. When π is zero, the losses of such producers
are zero, as can be seen by the fact that when π is zero, z is one. Thus,
according to equation 9, the losses from being near rational when z is
zero will also be zero. These losses will also continue to be small at lev-
els of inflation near zero, since the derivative of equation 9 with respect
to π is also zero when π is zero. 
Second, equation 9 serves as the springboard for the completion of the
model we will estimate below, which is based explicitly on the losses that
are entailed from near-rational behavior. To complete the model, it is
assumed that ﬁrm wage and price setters are willing to tolerate losses rel-
ative to their proﬁts only up to a given threshold, ε, before they will switch
to fully rational behavior. We assume that these thresholds are normally
distributed with mean  εand standard deviation  ε. The fraction of near-
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24. A slightly more complicated formula will give the relative profits when π is differ-
ent from πe.
9573—02 BPEA Akerlo/Dickens/Per  7/21/00 10:18  Page 14where   is the standard cumulative normal distribution, and  ε and  ε
are, respectively, the mean and the standard deviation of the distribution of
the thresholds ε.
Finally, equation 9 also yields benchmark estimates of the losses due
to near-rational behavior. Table 1 shows the fraction of the profits of the
fully rational firm sacrificed by the near-rational firm at different rates of
inflation for two different values of a and two different values of both  
and  .
To put the values in table 1 in perspective, consider the findings of
Jonathan Leonard and of Steven Davis, John Haltiwanger, and Scott Schuh
that the typical firm annually experiences shocks to demand that cause it 
to adjust its size up or down by roughly 10 percent.25 Failing to adjust capac-
ity to accommodate such a shock would cost a ﬁrm 10 percent of its proﬁts.
Thus it does not seem hard to believe that, for the typical ﬁrm, the issue of
how to treat inﬂation in setting prices is far down the list of items demand-
ing managerial attention, at least as long as inﬂation is under 5 percent.  
Implications for the Long-Run and the 
Short-Run Phillips Curve
The model also allows easy derivation of both a short-run Phillips curve
with given expectations of price inflation, and a long-run Phillips curve
where actual and expected inflation must coincide. The short-run wage
Phillips curve is obtained from wage-setting behavior and the equation
for the average wage. The average wage in this economy will be
(11)
Using the wage-setting behavior of the rational and near-rational ﬁrms,
(12)
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25. Leonard (1987); Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996).
9573—02 BPEA Akerlo/Dickens/Per  7/21/00 10:18  Page 15using the deﬁnition of the reference wage. Dividing both sides by w   –1 and
collecting terms yields the relation
(14)
where πw is the rate of wage inﬂation. Taking the logarithms of both sides
of equation 14, and approximating ln (1 + πw) by πw, ln [1 +  πe + 
(1 –  )aπe)] by [  + (1 –  ) a] π e, and ln [A – Cu]/[B(1 –  )]1/  by its
linear approximation, d – eu, yields the short-run wage Phillips curve
(15)
where f = (1 – a)(1 –  ).
A price Phillips curve similar to equation 15 can also be derived from
the model. The slight difference between the price Phillips curve implied
by our model and the wage Phillips curve in equation 15 is the inclusion of
a change-in-unemployment term in the price Phillips curve. This term enters
because changes in the unemployment rate will cause changes in produc-
tivity and hence, through equation 6, in the price-wage markups.26 We take
this into account when we estimate the model by allowing lags on the unem-
, 1 ππ w
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26. The price Phillips curve will be of the form
π = c – eu + f πe + (1 – f )h  ue,
where h = –C/[B(1 –  )], u is current unemployment, and  ue is the expected change in
unemployment.
Table 1.  Share of Proﬁts of a Fully Rational Firm Lost by Near-Rational Behavior in
the Treatment of Inﬂation
Percent
Near-rational ﬁrms ignore Near-rational ﬁrms underweight
inﬂation (a = 0) inﬂation (a = 0.7)
Inﬂation
Elasticitya   = 3 Elasticity   = 5 Elasticity   = 3 Elasticity   = 5
(percent)   = 0.1   = 0.75   = 0.1   = 0.75   = 0.1   = 0.75   = 0.1   = 0.75
1 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.11 0.003 0.003 0.01 0.009
2 0.16 0.13 0.50 0.44 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04
3 0.36 0.30 1.14 1.01 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.08
4 0.65 0.53 2.07 1.83 0.05 0.04 0.17 0.15
5 1.03 0.85 3.32 2.91 0.08 0.07 0.26 0.23
Source: Authors’calculations.
a. Elasticity of demand. The parameter   represents the curvature of the unit cost function.
9573—02 BPEA Akerlo/Dickens/Per  7/21/00 10:18  Page 16ployment rate. The steady-state Phillips curves with constant unemployment
will be unaffected by varying markups caused by varying unemployment. 
The short-run Phillips curve in equation 15 should come as no sur-
prise. If all inflation had been included in the mental frames of the firms,
which are the wage and price setters in this model, the coefﬁcient f would
be equal to zero. The near-rational firms, which constitute a fraction 
(1 –  ) of all ﬁrms, ignore a fraction (1 – a) of inﬂation. As a consequence,
the Phillips curve in equation 15 mimics the usual inflation-augmented
Phillips curve, but with a fraction (1 – a)(1 –  ) of the expected inflation
ignored. Thus the Phillips curve in equation 15 is not just an artifact of
our illustrative model of price and wage setting. As long as a fraction of
inflation is ignored or underweighted in near-rational wage and price
setting, that fraction of inﬂation should fail to enter the inﬂation augmen-
tation term. A whole spectrum of other models in which various combi-
nations of firms and workers ignore or underweight inflation in their
mental frames will yield similar results.
Using equation 15, the long-run Phillips curve, where actual and
expected inﬂation are equal, will be 
(16)
where u
n is the natural rate of unemployment if all firms are rational. Its
value in this model is d/e.
The long-run Phillips curve in equation 16 will be bowed inward and
then forward bending. At zero inflation, π is zero, and therefore unem-
ployment is at the natural rate. At very high inflation all firms will have
given up being near rational. The losses from near-rational behavior will
be sufficiently large that, by equation 10,   will be close to one—so that
f, which is (1 –  )(1 – a), will be close to zero. Thus, at both very high and
very low inflation, unemployment will be close to the natural rate, which
is the level of unemployment that would occur if all firms were totally
rational. At inﬂation above zero, unemployment will always be below the
natural rate, since f will always be positive; however, at high rates of inﬂa-
tion the natural rate is an asymptote.
Figure 1 portrays the rate of unemployment that corresponds to differ-
ent levels of inflation in the long run with benchmark parameters. We have
assumed that near-rational firms completely ignore inflation (a = 0). We
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ﬁrms are rational by the time inﬂation is at 5 percent a year. We also chose
  at 0.75 and an elasticity of demand ( ) of 3 (which implies a value for
 ε of 0.005, or 0.15 percent of normal proﬁts), although, as we will discuss
below, these assumptions hardly matter for the shape of ﬁgure 1. 
The level of inflation that maximizes the product of f and π according
to equation 16 will minimize unemployment. For the parameter values cho-
sen to create ﬁgure 1, that inﬂation rate is 2.6 percent. At that rate of inﬂa-
tion the long-run equilibrium rate of unemployment is 1.7 percentage points
lower than at either a rate of inﬂation of zero or a rate above 6 percent.
27
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27. Interestingly, our choices of the values of the elasticity of demand ( ) and the cur-
vature of the productivity function ( ) hardly matter for the shape of the curve in figure 1
or for the lowest sustainable rate of unemployment and its accompanying rate of inflation.
Once we set the fraction of ﬁrms that are near rational at two points, we have described the
curve for a given value of a. This result reﬂects a ﬁnding that will surface again later when
we estimate the model, which is discussed in more detail in the next section. That is that
the loss function is very nearly approximated by a constant times the square of inﬂation, so
that the argument of the cumulative normal in our model can be very well approximated






Inflation (percent per year)
Unemployment (percent)
Source: Authors' calculations from calibration of the theoretical model.
Figure 1. A Hypothetical Long-Run Phillips Curve
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our model, inﬂation is not underestimated, but instead it is underweighted
in the reference wage used for wage setting. This has the same con-
sequences as underestimation. Near-rational firms either ignore or fail 
to fully project inflation, so they set lower wages, and therefore also set
lower prices, relative to nominal demand, than they would if they were
fully rational. Since the wages of fully rational firms are affected by the
wages paid by near-rational firms, both types of firms pay lower wages
than they would if all firms were fully rational. At these lower wages,
employment will be higher. These higher levels would also occur in the
slightly different version of the model in which workers underestimate
the impact of inﬂation.
28
Empirical Evidence for Near-Rational Wage and Price Setting
In this section we discuss three related types of evidence for the impor-
tance of the type of behavior we describe. We begin by recounting the ﬁnd-
ings of Brainard and Perry’s recent analysis of a Phillips curve model
with time-varying parameters. We then do a simple exercise estimating
Phillips curves on a split sample to see how the estimated coefficient of
inﬂation differs between periods of high and low inﬂation. Finally, we esti-
mate the model described in the previous section and present estimates of
the unemployment-minimizing rate of inﬂation and the employment gains
from being there rather than at the natural rate.
Time-Varying Parameters 
In the Brainard and Perry paper that we described at the outset,
29 the
authors were addressing how uncertainty affects policymaking. Their
empirical work demonstrating one key source of uncertainty reveals
precisely the departures from conventional NAIRU models that our model
predicts. Previous work examining how the NAIRU varied over time
assumed the NAIRU framework and allowed time variation only in the
George A. Akerlof, William T. Dickens, and George L. Perry 19
28. We have resisted the temptation to call the unemployment-minimizing rate of
inflation the optimal rate. In this model productivity also varies with the rate of inflation.
Therefore, at the minimum unemployment rate, output is not at its maximum. 
29. Brainard and Perry (2000).
9573—02 BPEA Akerlo/Dickens/Per  7/21/00 10:18  Page 19intercept of the equation.30 Brainard and Perry applied a general Kalman ﬁl-
ter estimation that permits all the key Phillips curve parameters to vary—
lagged inflation and unemployment as well as the intercept—and lets the
data choose the allocation of time variation among them. Figure 2 summa-
rizes their results with CPI inflation as the dependent variable. The figure
shows substantial time variation in the coefficient of the lagged inflation
term, and virtual stability in the intercept and the coefﬁcient of the inverse
unemployment rate, which they measure by the unemployment rate of 25-
to 54-year-old men to account for demographic changes over time. The
coefficient on lagged inflation is low during periods of low inflation and
approaches one only in the inﬂationary middle years of the sample period.
The virtual stability over time in the unemployment coefﬁcient and the
intercept in the Brainard-Perry time-varying estimates is also worth
noting. Rather than attributing the episodes of sustained low unemploy-
20 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2000













































Source: Brainard and Perry (2000).
Figure 2.  Recursive Least-Squares Estimates and Time-Varying Kalman Filter 
Estimates of Price Phillips Curve Parameters, 1960–98
9573—02 BPEA Akerlo/Dickens/Per  7/21/00 10:18  Page 20ment to declines in a NAIRU that is invariant to inflation, these results
suggest a change in price- and wage-setting behavior that accompanied
periods of low inflation. The model described above predicts coefficients
on lagged inﬂation that change with the inﬂation regime while coefﬁcients
elsewhere are constant. 
Brainard and Perry compare their Kalman ﬁlter estimates with recursive
least-squares estimates, which are also shown in figure 2. These compar-
isons suggest why conventional estimation has seemed to support the
NAIRU model since Franco Modigliani and Lucas Papademos introduced
it in the inflationary mid-1970s.
31 Before that time, lagged inflation in
Phillips curves had been consistently estimated to have a coefficient well
below one. But the large increase in inflation in the mid-1970s corre-
sponded to a period of large variance in inﬂation, and ﬁxed-coefﬁcient esti-
mation has been dominated by that episode ever since. If the coefﬁcients in
fact have varied over time, any procedure that assumes that they are ﬁxed
will yield misleading results. This includes the recursive estimates, which
treat them as ﬁxed in each interval over which they are estimated.
Periods of Low and High Inﬂation
The postwar U.S. economy has experienced extended episodes of both
low and moderately high inflation that permit direct comparison of the
NAIRU model with our own. Conventional NAIRU models use a modiﬁed
Phillips curve in which lagged inflation is taken as a measure of adaptive
inflationary expectations, and the coefficients on lagged inflation sum to
one. By contrast, our model allows the possibility that the coefficient on
expected inflation will be lower in extended periods of low inflation than
in extended periods of high inﬂation. Absent estimation biases, we would
expect the coefficient to approach one in a sufficiently inflationary envi-
ronment. We first look at the empirical evidence using the conventional
adaptive expectations framework. We then provide evidence using direct
measures of inflationary expectations that address Sargent’s criticism of
the assumption that the coefﬁcient on lagged inﬂation must equal one in an
accelerationist model.
32 Sargent argued that a coefficient of less than one
on lagged inflation may reflect not incomplete projection of inflation, but
rather forecasters’views that the process generating inﬂation does not have
George A. Akerlof, William T. Dickens, and George L. Perry 21
31. Modigliani and Papademos (1975).
32. Sargent (1971).
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rule out the possibility that our results reflect differences in how people
form expectations rather than in how they use them.33
In order to separately estimate wage and price Phillips curves for
periods of low and high inﬂation, we sorted the quarters since the Korean
War according to the average CPI inflation rate in the five-year period
ending each quarter. We first classified quarters with average annualized
inflation rates below 3 percent as low-inflation quarters, and those with
average inflation rates above 4 percent as high-inflation quarters.34 By
this sorting, the low-inﬂation quarters run from 1954:1 through 1969:1 and
from 1995:3 through 1999:4, the end of our sample period. The high-
inflation quarters run from 1970:2 through 1986:1 and from 1990:4
through 1993:2. As it happens, there are seventy-seven quarters both in the
high-inﬂation sample and in the low-inﬂation sample. The mean CPI inﬂa-
tion rates in the two samples are 6.3 percent and 2.0 percent, respectively.
This separation was used in half of the wage and price inflation regres-
sions. In the other half we limited the low-inﬂation sample to quarters with
inflation rates below 2.5 percent, which brought the sample size down to
sixty-two quarters and reduced the mean CPI inflation rate in the low-
inﬂation sample to 1.9 percent.
Estimates with Adaptive Expectations
The quarterly Phillips curve equations we estimated were intended to
span the specifications that analysts have used in conventional estimation
of NAIRU models, except for the fact that we did not constrain the coefﬁ-
cients on lagged inflation. To this end, we tried a large number of data
combinations and specifications on both wage and price Phillips curves,
and ran each separately for the low- and high-inflation samples just
described. In all cases the dependent variable was an annualized inflation
rate in either wages or prices, and the explanatory variables were current
or lagged values of unemployment, price inﬂation, and, for the wage equa-
tions, trend productivity growth. For price inflation we used the CPI, the
GDP deflator, and the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) deflator
22 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2000
33. We are grateful to a seminar participant at the Bank of Canada for suggesting this
approach.
34. By sorting our sample on the basis of long lags of the endogenous variable, we con-
siderably reduce concern about sample selection on the basis of an endogenous variable. 
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inflation were used as explanatory variables. For wage inflation we used
the best series available for any time period, linking private wages and
salaries as measured by the employment cost index (ECI) for 1980–99 to
the adjusted hourly earnings index for the nonfarm economy for 1961–80
and to adjusted hourly earnings in manufacturing for 1954–61. Twelve
lagged values of CPI inflation were used as explanatory variables. For
unemployment we used the rate for all workers (the total rate), the rate
for 25- to 54-year-old males, and Robert Shimer’s demographically
adjusted series.
35 We used the current and three lagged values of unem-
ployment and, alternatively, the current and eleven lagged values. For the
wage Phillips curves we used two estimates of trend productivity growth,
one being a series based on work by Robert Gordon and the other the
series we constructed for our 1996 paper.
36 We ran regressions with the
productivity coefficient either freely estimated or constrained to be one
(for the wage inflation equations), and with just the current trend or with
the current plus seven lagged values of the trend.
37
The key results are summarized in figure 3 for equations explaining
wages and in ﬁgure 4 for equations explaining prices. The ﬁgures present
the results of 144 and 72 specifications, respectively. Each point repre-
sents the sum of the coefﬁcients on lagged inﬂation estimated for the low-
and the high-inﬂation samples for one speciﬁcation. If the sums of the coef-
ﬁcients were similar for the two samples, the points would cluster along the 
45-degree line. If they were similar and near one, the points would cluster
near the upper right corner. In fact, for both wages and prices, and over the
wide range of speciﬁcations and data we used, the points cluster near one
on the high-inflation axis, but on the low-inflation axis they range from
around zero to around 0.5 for the wage equations. This is consistent with
the predictions of our model. The range on the price equations is broader
and less conclusive. The third of the observations at the highest end of the
range are from equations using the PCE deflator. The mean values of the
coefﬁcients on the high- and low-inﬂation axes, respectively, are 0.25 and
0.82 for the wage equations and 0.60 and 0.95 for the price equations.
George A. Akerlof, William T. Dickens, and George L. Perry 23
35. Shimer (1998).
36. Gordon (1998); Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996).
37. All the equations also used the customary dummy variables for the guidepost period
of the 1960s and the price controls period of the 1970s, and used the difference between
inﬂation with and without oil prices in 1979–80 as an additional variable. 
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As in Brainard and Perry’s paper, the results just described cast doubt on
conventional estimates with the NAIRU model. However, both analyses treat
expectations as adaptive and so cannot refute Sargent’s criticism that ratio-
nal expectations are formed differently and that the coefﬁcient on properly
measured expectations might be one. We now address this issue by using
direct measures of expected inﬂation as explanatory variables in place of dis-
tributed lags of actual inﬂation rates, while maintaining our division of the
sample into periods of high and low inﬂation. The other explanatory vari-
ables are the same as those used in the regressions behind ﬁgures 3 and 4.
We used the two direct measures of expected rates of inﬂation that are avail-
able over our sample period: that from the University of Michigan’s Survey
of Consumers and that from the Federal Reserve’s Livingston Surveys.











Figure 3.  Wage Equations: Sum of Coefficients on Lagged Inflation in Low- and 
High-Inflation Samples, 1954–99
Source: Coefficient estimates from 144 regression specifications as described in the text.  
High-inflation samples
9573—02 BPEA Akerlo/Dickens/Per  7/21/00 10:18  Page 24Figures 5 and 6 plot the estimated coefﬁcients on expected inﬂation for the
variously specified wage and price regressions, respectively. As with the
results using adaptive expectations, the coefﬁcients on expected inﬂation are
substantially different in the low- and high-inﬂation periods. For 288 wage
equations the low- and high-period means are 0.29 and 0.85, respectively.
For 144 price equations the means are 0.25 and 1.00, respectively.
These results support our general hypothesis even more convincingly
than do the results with adaptive expectations. Not only do they address
the point that the relevant coefficient for natural rate theory is not neces-
sarily the coefficient estimated with adaptive expectations, but the results
are as clear about price inﬂation as they are about wage inﬂation. 
One possible objection to the results presented here and in the next sec-
tion is that the lower coefﬁcients on inﬂationary expectations during peri-






–0.25 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25
Means:
Total CPI GDP deflator PCE deflator
Low 0.60 0.63 0.40 0.76
High 0.94 0.92 0.97 0.94
Low-inflation samples
Figure 4.  Price Equations: Sum of Coefficients on Lagged Inflation in Low- and 
High-Inflation Samples, 1954–99
Source: Coefficient estimates from 72 regression specifications as described in the text.  
High-inflation samples
9573—02 BPEA Akerlo/Dickens/Per  7/21/00 10:18  Page 25ods of low inﬂation are an artifact of measurement error. For example, if the
variance of measurement error is constant whereas the variance of true
inflationary expectations is higher in times of high inflation, then the
coefficient on expectations could be biased toward zero more in 
times of low inflation than in times of high inflation. We investigated 
this possibility. Although it is true that the variance of expectations 
is higher in periods of high inflation, it is also true that the sampling 
error in both the Survey of Consumers and the Livingston Survey is higher.
In fact, the sampling error is so much higher that the computed bias is
higher in the low-inﬂation periods, imparting a bias against our ﬁnding that
the coefﬁcient on expectations is lower in periods of low inﬂation. 
Sampling error may not be the only source of error in the survey expec-
tations. Neither survey may be asking the right people with the right
weights. In an attempt to approximate how much error this problem might











Figure 5.  Wage Equations: Coefficients on Price Expectations Variables in Low- and 
High-Inflation Samples, 1954–99
Source: Coefficient estimates from 288 regression specifications as described in the text.  
High-inflation samples
9573—02 BPEA Akerlo/Dickens/Per  7/21/00 10:18  Page 26introduce, we computed the bias that would be caused if the measure-
ment error variance in expectations were equal to the variance of the resid-
ual of a regression of one of our survey expectations on the other. Again
we found that the measurement error variance grew faster than the condi-
tional variance of the expectations, so that the bias caused thereby would
work against our finding that the coefficient on expectations was lower
when inﬂation was low. 
Estimating the Model 
Previously we showed how a Phillips curve–type relation can be
derived from our theoretical model (equation 15). In this section we
present estimates of the model and of the rate of inﬂation that permits the






–0.25 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25
Means:
Total CPI GDP deflator PCE deflator
Low 0.25 0.56 0.00 0.20
High 1.00 1.16 0.94 0.91
Low-inflation samples
Figure 6.  Price Equations: Coefficients on Price Expectations Variables in Low- and 
High-Inflation Samples, 1954–99
Source: Coefficient estimates from 144 regression specifications as described in the text.  
High-inflation samples
9573—02 BPEA Akerlo/Dickens/Per  7/21/00 10:18  Page 27lowest sustainable level of unemployment. We also show the gain in
employment compared with operating at the natural rate. This section
will first discuss the specification of the model we estimate, then our
benchmark results, and ﬁnally, an analysis of their robustness. 
Speciﬁcations
In theory, with a large enough sample, it would be possible to estimate
the full model presented above. The elasticity of demand ( ), the parame-
ter for the curvature of the unit cost function ( ), and the parameters of the
distribution of rationality thresholds (  and  ) all have different effects
on the objective function. However, in practice it was impossible to esti-
mate more than the mean of the distribution of rationality thresholds and
one of the other parameters. The reason is that all three of them—the elas-
ticity of demand, the curvature of the productivity function, and the stan-
dard deviation of the distribution of rationality thresholds—act in much
the same way to determine the impact of past rates of inflation on the
cumulative normal term (see equation 15).
This lack of identiﬁcation in practice can be understood if we consider
a Taylor series approximation to the argument of the cumulative normal in
equation 15, expanded around a value of zero inﬂation. There is no reason
to expect that the argument will be exactly zero at zero inﬂation, so the con-
stant term will likely be present. As noted, the ﬁrst derivative of the ﬁrm’s
loss function with respect to inﬂation is zero at zero inﬂation and very small
at most rates of inﬂation less than 10 percent. Thus the ﬁrst-order term of
the Taylor series expansion of the argument of the cumulative normal will
also be zero. Second- and higher-order terms will be present, but our analy-
sis of the loss function suggests that, with inflation between zero and 10
percent, and with reasonable values for the elasticity of demand, the
curvature of the unit cost function, and the standard deviation of the distri-
bution of rationality thresholds, the third-order and higher terms are unim-
portant. An approximation of the loss function of the form Eπ
2, where the
constant E was chosen so that the approximation was exactly equal to the
loss at 5 percent inﬂation, was never off by more than 3 percent of the loss.
One parameter is all that is necessary to capture the effects of all three para-
meters from the model ( ,  , and  ) on the derivative of the argument of the
cumulative normal with respect to inﬂation.
We thus estimate a Phillips curve of the form 
28 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2000
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where π is the rate of inflation,   is the cumulative standard normal den-
sity function, π
e is inflationary expectations, u is a term capturing the
effects of current and lagged unemployment on inflation, X is a vector of
dummy variables for oil shocks and price controls,   is the error term,
and d, D, E, e, and g are parameters to be estimated.
38
The term πL represents the effects of past inﬂation on the likelihood that
people will act rationally toward inﬂation. Our theory tells us nothing about
the way in which inﬂation should matter other than the sign of E, so we proxy
πL with several different, parsimonious speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst is a geomet-
rically declining, weighted moving average of past values of inﬂation: 
(18)
where   is a parameter to be estimated. 
Alternatively we estimate πL as
(19)
where the parameter   is estimated. Our ﬁnal two speciﬁcations for πL treat
it as a four-year moving average of past inflation with equal weights, or
with the relative weights of quarters from each year estimated (three addi-
tional parameters). 
It is standard practice in Phillips curve estimation to proxy inﬂationary
expectations with lagged values of inflation. In many specifications dis-
cussed below we follow that tradition. When we do, we use either a
twelve-quarter unrestricted lag or one of the methods used to construct πL
to construct π
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38. This speciﬁcation ignores the parameter a from the theoretical model. In theory that
parameter could be estimated, but we do not take the theoretical model that literally. Instead
we imagine that there is a continuum of reactions to increasing inﬂation, with people putting
more and more weight on it until their behavior resembles that of the rational economic
actor in the standard model. The model we estimate here can be thought of as a model where
a fraction (1 –  ) of people are ignoring inflation. Or the   function can be thought of as
approximating a more general function that reflects how much weight the average person
is putting on inﬂation in making economic decisions.
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e might reflect changes in the process by
which expectations are formed rather than how they are used. Thus we also
use direct survey measures of inflationary expectations for π
e in some
speciﬁcations.
Our different speciﬁcations include several different measures of unem-
ployment and different numbers of lags. The unemployment term, u, is
constructed using one of three data series. The first is the aggregate U.S.
unemployment rate from the Current Population Survey of the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. Because this variable may be influenced by changing
demographics, we have also considered two alternative measures: the
unemployment rate for prime-age males and Shimer’s demographically
corrected series.
39 We also vary the number of unemployment lags from
zero to eleven quarters. 
For the dependent variable we variously use four different measures of
inflation: the annualized percentage change in the urban consumer price
index, the GDP deﬂator, the PCE deﬂator, and the index of wage and salary
compensation constructed by Brainard and Perry.
40 When we use the per-
centage change in the compensation index as the dependent variable, we
subtract off a measure of trend productivity growth. The three specifica-
tions of this trend are a measure based on Gordon, the measure we con-
structed for our 1996 paper, and a sixteen-quarter moving average.
41
The form of the Phillips curve here is similar in some respects to the
one in our 1996 paper that modeled the implications of downward nominal
wage rigidity. Therefore we also examine whether we can successfully
estimate a Phillips curve that embodies the insights from that model as
well as the current one. Below we estimate a number of specifications
that augment equation 17 with the term for nominal rigidity from that
previous paper.
42 When we nest that model, we must also estimate its key
parameter—the standard deviation of desired wage changes—along with
the other parameters from the current model.
43
30 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2000
39. Shimer (1998).
40. Brainard and Perry (2000).
41. Gordon (1998); Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996).
42. The inclusion of the term for nominal rigidity could be motivated if we included ﬁrm
profitability or firm-specific labor market considerations in the productivity function. That
would produce heterogeneity in desired wage setting, with ﬁrms constrained by the ﬂoor of no
nominal wage decrease forced to pay a higher wage as in the model in our previous paper.
43. See Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996, appendix A) for its specification. We leave
out the term for the change in proﬁts, which could not be robustly estimated.
9573—02 BPEA Akerlo/Dickens/Per  7/21/00 10:18  Page 30The model was estimated with quarterly U.S. data from the first quar-
ter of 1954 through the last quarter of 1999, although we vary the end
date in some speciﬁcations to check the extent to which our results depend
on the experience of the 1990s. Data sources and the specification of the
dummy variables for price controls and oil shocks can be found in table A1
in the appendix.
44 All the parameters of the model were estimated simul-
taneously by nonlinear least squares.
Results
Table 2 presents results for four different estimates with five types of
variation: in the dependent variable, in the method of constructing π
e and
πL, in the unemployment measure and its lags, in the sample period, and
in the inclusion of the term for nominal rigidity.  
Our first focus of attention is the estimated value of the cumulative
normal multiplying inflationary expectations when inflation is zero. In
the theoretical model this corresponds to the fraction of ﬁrms behaving in
a fully rational fashion at zero inﬂation. The model predicts that this frac-
tion will be less than unity, and that as inflation increases above zero, the
fraction of rational ﬁrms will rise. Both of these predictions yield tests of
the model.
The NAIRU specification for the Phillips curve is nested in our model
and can be obtained if the value of D is sufﬁciently high. For example, if D
were 2 or higher, the coefficient on inflationary expectations would never
fall below 0.97, and there would be little room for changing experience
with inflation to affect the coefficient on inflationary expectations. All of
the four estimated values of D imply coefficients on expected inflation of
0.5 or less at zero inﬂation. The lowest implies a coefﬁcient of 0.19. In all
four cases a value of D that would imply a coefficient of 0.9 or greater
(1.28) can be rejected at conventional levels of signiﬁcance. 
The instantaneous effect of increasing inﬂation above zero can be com-
puted as one minus the cumulative normal evaluated at D, divided by the
sum of the coefficients on unemployment and its lags. Those values are
about –1.2 or larger (in absolute value) in the speciﬁcations presented here.
Thus, to a ﬁrst-order approximation, raising inﬂation from zero to 1 percent
will cause a reduction in unemployment of 1.2 percentage points or more. 
George A. Akerlof, William T. Dickens, and George L. Perry 31
44. We use dummy variables rather than an import price or energy price measure because
we believe that these were atypical events that had atypical effects on the economy.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9573—02 BPEA Akerlo/Dickens/Per  7/21/00 10:18  Page 32The term that most distinguishes our model from that of the textbooks
is the coefﬁcient of the square of lagged inﬂation in the cumulative normal
multiplying inflationary expectations (E). If E is zero, the coefficient on
expectations will not vary with past rates of inflation. Our theory says it
should, and that is what we ﬁnd in each of the speciﬁcations we have esti-
mated. In all four speciﬁcations presented above, E is large, and more than
1.65 times its estimated standard error. Going from zero to 5 percent inﬂa-
tion would increase the argument of the cumulative normal by 1.2 to 7.0,
depending on the specification. Except in specifications with CPI inflation
as the dependent variable, the coefficient on inflationary expectations is
above 0.95 by the time inﬂation has reached 4 percent. For the CPI speci-
ﬁcation the coefﬁcient is 0.6 at 4 percent inﬂation and rises above 0.95 at
about 6.5 percent.
Besides allowing us to estimate the effect of inflation on the use of
inflationary expectations, estimating our model also allows us to calculate
the lowest sustainable rate of unemployment and the accompanying rate
of inflation. We have computed these rates of inflation for each of the four
models in table 2 from the estimated parameters numerically. We have
also computed the natural rate in each model and the lowest sustainable
rate of unemployment. Inflation at that unemployment rate ranges from
1.6 to 3.4 percent. The difference between the natural rate and the lowest
sustainable rate of unemployment ranges from 1.5 to 3.1 percentage
points. Figure 7 shows the long-run relationship between inflation and
unemployment implied by each of the four specifications estimated in
table 2. 
The values of the coefficient of inflationary expectations implied by
our parameter estimates are plotted in figure 8 for each of our four spec-
ifications. In all cases the coefficient values vary considerably over the
sample. In all four specifications the coefficient on inflation reaches a
maximum value of one for at least a year at some point during the sam-
ple period in the early to mid-1970s. The four specifications differ in the
exact timing of the increase in the 1970s, in how the 1950s and the 1990s
are treated, and in the date of the end of the period of a coefficient of
one on inflation. 
These figures can be compared with the time path Brainard and Perry
estimated for the coefficient on inflation.
45 Our estimates imply consider-
George A. Akerlof, William T. Dickens, and George L. Perry 33
45. Brainard and Perry (2000).  




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9573—02 BPEA Akerlo/Dickens/Per  7/21/00 10:18  Page 35ably more abrupt changes and more persistence. They also imply more
variation. However, it must be remembered that the method Brainard and
Perry used to estimate their values for the coefﬁcient on inﬂation imposes
smoothness on the changes. When we smooth our estimates (results not
shown), they begin to resemble the time path that Brainard and Perry
found, with one major difference. The Brainard-Perry estimates peak
earlier and fall off more abruptly than our smoothed estimates. 
We have varied the speciﬁcations presented above to anticipate possible
objections to our results. The specification with the CPI as the dependent
variable, which is estimated using only data through 1989:4, shows that
our results do not depend on the experience of the 1990s, which may be
atypical. Since nonlinear estimation is difficult when many parameters
are being estimated, we have generally used very parsimonious speciﬁca-
tions for the lags on past price inflation when constructing inflationary
expectations. One might object that this parsimony forces the coefficient
on inﬂation to do the work that a richer lag structure would do. The spec-
ification where the GDP deflator is the dependent variable answers this
by matching the richest possible lag structure for price expectations
(twelve-quarter unrestricted) with the most parsimonious specification of
the term in the coefficient of expectations (a sixteen-quarter equally
weighted moving average with no free parameters). Likewise, in most
specifications, the inclusion of lagged unemployment, or our term for
nominal rigidity, or both does not change our fundamental results. 
Our Durbin-Watson statistics for the two specifications using survey
expectations show considerable serial correlation. We have not attempted
to correct for this problem because we lack a credible instrument for price
expectations, which are endogenous with respect to the error in the Phillips
curve. We are unhappy with this drawback of the analysis, but estimates of
our model that we have tried using simulated data suggest that the bias from
ignoring the serial correlation in the parameters we care about is minor.
Robustness of the Results
As noted above, there are many aspects of the speciﬁcation that are not
dictated by the theory. Our approach to this problem has been to estimate
a wide array of different specifications to determine whether our primary
results are sensitive to changes in the speciﬁcation. 
Because both the estimation of the model and the numerical analysis
of the results currently require human intervention, we have not been able
36 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2000
9573—02 BPEA Akerlo/Dickens/Per  7/21/00 10:18  Page 36to mechanize the process of sensitivity testing. Thus we have not been able
to do an exhaustive specification search. Instead we estimated 218 differ-
ent specifications, many of which were run to test specific concerns.
However, most were chosen randomly.
46 Our survey of the results of these
speciﬁcations yields the following generalizations.
The most important is that nearly all the point estimates imply that sig-
niﬁcant gains in employment are possible by increasing inﬂation from zero
to a rate above 1.5 percent. This can be seen in figure 9, which plots for
each specification the rate of inflation at the lowest sustainable unem-
ployment rate and the reduction in unemployment that one obtains from
increasing inflation from zero to that rate. In only twelve specifications
was the estimated gain less than 1 percentage point, and in only one was
it negligible. This specification was a wage Phillips curve with a rich lag
structure for price expectations in which the inflation term in the coeffi-
cient on expectations was constrained to be an equally weighted, sixteen-
quarter moving average of past inflation. Allowing a richer specification
for the impact of inﬂation on the use of expectations eliminates this result.
Of the other eleven specifications where the estimated impact is less than
1 percent, all are at least a half a percentage point. Most of the specifica-
tions are wage equations, and none use the PCE deﬂator as the dependent
variable. Only one uses survey expectations. In no case are the parame-
ters of the inflation coefficient very precisely estimated, so that values
more typical of other speciﬁcations cannot be ruled out. 
A second generalization is that it is not possible to robustly distinguish
the relative importance of the effects of nominal rigidity and those of near
rationality. The majority of specifications that included our term for the
effects of nominal rigidity give results like those for the PCE in table 2.
These do suggest a role for both nominal rigidity and near rationality.
However, in many speciﬁcations that include both effects, the effect of past
inﬂation on the coefﬁcient of expectations is not measured precisely, being
about the same size as its estimated standard error.
47 In other cases, the
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46. We set a goal of 200 speciﬁcations, met that goal, and then estimated a few more to
check specific concerns that arose in the process of evaluating the original 200 specifica-
tions. In randomly choosing specifications we allowed all options with equal probability,
except that we found that the twelve-quarter unrestricted lag on inﬂation for the price expec-
tations term was always computationally burdensome, so we did not include those specifi-
cations in those that were randomly chosen.
47. In contrast, when the term for nominal rigidity was not included, the coefficient on
the square of past inﬂation was nearly always at least 1.7 times its estimated standard error
or more.  
9573—02 BPEA Akerlo/Dickens/Per  7/21/00 10:18  Page 37optimization routine was trying to drive estimates of the standard deviation
of desired wage changes to zero. In six specifications not represented in
figure 9, we obtained converged estimates for the parameters, but the
estimated values for   were sufﬁciently large that there was no single rate
of inflation at which the unemployment rate was minimized. It simply
fell to the natural rate asymptotically as in the models estimated for our
1996 paper.
48
We encountered few problems with applying nonlinear estimation. We
did look for and find a few cases where there were multiple local mini-
mums, but these reﬂected minor differences in the lag structures that were
not substantive. Of the 218 specifications we estimated, we were unable to
obtain converged values for about 30. This might be a serious concern
because, under the hypothesis of fully rational behavior, the model’s
parameters are not identiﬁed. It might be that the nonlinear estimation pro-
gram is trying to drive the constant term in the coefficient on inflationary
expectations to inﬁnity in order to drive the coefﬁcient on expectations to
38 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2000






Rate of inflation at the lowest sustainable unemployment rate (percent per year)
Unemployment rate at zero inflation minus the minimum unemployment rate (percentage points)
Total or Shimer unemployment
Prime-age male unemployment
Figure 9.  Robustness Analysis for the Nonlinear Model
Source: Coefficient estimates from 218 regression specifications as described in the text.
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49 However, this is not what was happening in any of the cases of
convergence problems that we encountered.
50
Overall, the results from estimating our model support the theory 
we have laid out. They suggest that macroeconomic policy should 
aim for a rate of inﬂation in the range of 1.5 to 4 percent. Either higher or
lower rates seem likely to result in lower output and employment. 
Conclusion
This paper offers an alternative to natural rate models of unemploy-
ment. Natural rate models provide a wonderful economics “just-so” story,
based on the idea that firms and workers take full account of expected
inflation in setting current wages and prices. This behavior produces a
unique long-run unemployment rate, the natural rate, that is consistent
with any steady rate of inflation, and a short-run Phillips curve in which
unemployment above or below the natural rate causes inflation to decel-
erate or accelerate.
Our model of the macroeconomy rests on different behavioral under-
pinnings, which are supported by a range of related evidence, including
the psychological literature on decisionmaking and perception, direct sur-
vey evidence on how people react to inflation, and the advice of compen-
sation professionals. We propose that when inflation is low it is not
especially salient, and wage and price setting will respond less than pro-
portionally to expected inﬂation. At sufﬁciently high rates of inﬂation, by
contrast, anticipating inflation becomes important, and wage and price
setting responds fully to expected inflation. This behavioral difference
between our model and the natural rate model has signiﬁcant implications
both for estimating the relation between inflation and real activity in the
macroeconomy and for informing the conduct of macroeconomic policy.
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49. When we generated simulated data with a standard Phillips curve model and
attempted to estimate our model on it, this is what happened.
50. Instead we had one of three other problems. Either the program was trying to drive
  to zero. Or the program was driving the constant term in the coefficient of expectations
to negative infinity, and the coefficient on the square of past inflation to infinity, to eliminate
coefﬁcient values between one and the lower ﬂoor. Or, in some very rich speciﬁcations, the
first derivatives of a group of unrelated parameters became so close to collinear that it was
impossible to invert the approximation to the Hessian used in the maximization routine. 
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curve, estimates of coefﬁcients on expected inﬂation, whether measured by
lagged inflation or by direct surveys of expectations, are greater when
inﬂation is high than when it is low. Estimates of our model provide further
support. Rather than a natural rate of unemployment that is invariant to the
rate of inflation, our model traces out a range of equilibrium unemploy-
ment rates associated with different ongoing inflation rates. The lowest
sustainable unemployment rate is the minimum of this range. The natural
unemployment rate is a special case: it is the equilibrium unemployment
rate at high inﬂation rates (and, ignoring downward wage rigidity, at zero
inflation). The natural rate is noticeably higher than the lowest sustain-
able unemployment rate. The rate of inflation that accompanies the low-
est sustainable unemployment rate is low, perhaps not far from current
values, but not zero. Operating with inflation either higher or lower leads
to a higher rate of unemployment in the long run.
The distinctive feature of our model is especially important for estima-
tion. In recent years, as low inflation rates have come to be the norm,
NAIRUs estimated from the empirical counterpart of the natural rate
model have proved to be misleading guides to policymakers and economic
analysts. In the mid-1990s these models typically projected 6 percent as
the lowest sustainable unemployment rate, yet real output has grown at a
4 percent annual rate since then, and the unemployment rate has fallen as
low as 3.9 percent. The NAIRUs estimated for the early 1960s, the previ-
ous period of moderate inﬂation, also appear unrealistic. When adapted for
estimation, the model we have developed should provide more useful esti-
mates of the attainable levels of employment to serve as a guide for stabi-
lization policy and as an anchor to longer-run projections.
Not only does our model fit the data better than NAIRU models, it is
also more cogent theoretically. NAIRU models serve well as what Irving
Fisher might call “the first approximation.” They are derived from the
assumption that all people behave according to what economists call eco-
nomic rationality, or else their deviations from that behavior are totally
random. This paper relies, as a first approximation, on exactly such eco-
nomic thinking. But Fisher also made “a Second [and even a Third]
Approximation.”
51 With aggregate Phillips curves, such further approxi-
mations involve departures from perfectly rational decisionmaking. The
40 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2000
51. Fisher (1930).
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the lay public do not use the same model of the economy as economists.
Given the complexity of their decisions and, for the most part, their lack of
training as economists, it would, indeed, be surprising if they did. It is thus
highly unlikely that the welter of interdependent, intuitively based deci-
sions of a real economy will produce a coefﬁcient of inﬂationary expecta-
tions on wage and price inﬂation that is always exactly one. This paper has
offered a theory for such a departure as price and wage setters under-
adjust for inflation when it is not very salient and when the cost of such
behavior is low. This theory yields a lowest sustainable rate of unemploy-
ment and an accompanying rate of inﬂation. It also ﬁts the facts.
George A. Akerlof, William T. Dickens, and George L. Perry 41
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Table A1.  Data Sources and Variable Construction
Data series Source and description
Consumer price index  Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) ofﬁcial data on the season-
(CPI) ally adjusted average of the CPI-U, 1982–84 = 100. An exper-
imental CPI calculated using geometric means, CPI-U-XG,
was used for the period 1990:1 to 1998:4. The CPI-U-XG was
seasonally adjusted using quarterly dummies. Data were
extracted from the BLS website’s Selective Access page,
www.bls.gov/sahome.html. We used quarterly averages of the
change in the logarithms of monthly data. (The CPI-U-XG
data were not used for some of the speciﬁcations in the robust-
ness check.)
Gross domestic product  Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) ofﬁcial data reﬂecting
(GDP) deﬂator the October 1999 benchmark revision for data back to 1959:2.
We used unrevised data before 1959:2 by necessity. Data were
extracted from the BEA website, www.bea.doc.gov. We used
quarterly averages of the change in the logarithms of monthly
data.
Personal consumption  BEA ofﬁcial data reﬂecting the October 1999 benchmark 
expenditure (PCE)  revision for data back to 1959:2. We used unrevised data 
deﬂator before 1959:2 by necessity. Data were extracted from the BEA
website. We used quarterly averages of the change in the loga-
rithms of monthly data.
Wage inﬂation This series comprises the best available BLS series for each
time period: employment cost index (ECI) wages and salaries
for 1980:2 through 1999:4, the adjusted hourly earnings index
for the nonfarm economy for 1964:2 through 1980:1, and
adjusted hourly earnings in manufacturing for 1954:1 through
1964:1. We use the change in the logarithm of quarterly data.
ECI wages and salaries BLS ofﬁcial data on seasonally adjusted, private industry
wages and salaries of all workers, extracted from the BLS
website’s Selective Access page. 
Adjusted hourly earnings    BLS ofﬁcial data on seasonally adjusted, current dollar 
index average hourly earnings (1977 weights) in the nonfarm econ-
omy. Data were extracted from the BLS website’s Selective
Access page. 
Adjusted hourly earnings  BLS ofﬁcial data on seasonally adjusted, current dollar 
in manufacturing average hourly earnings (1977 weights) in the manufacturing
sector. Data were extracted from an unpublished BLS series.
(continued)
42 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2000
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Data series Source and description
(continued)
Gordon productivity trend We constructed this variable using estimates of trend produc-
tivity over several time periods provided by Robert Gordon,
Northwestern University. We smoothed the transitions so that
the variable is equal to 0.0263 from the start of the sample
through 1971:2, after which it changes over nine quarters to a
value of 0.0124, which is maintained through 1986:2, after
which it drops to 0.0094 over eight quarters. From 1988:2
through 1994:4 it is constant and then rises over seven quar-
ters to 0.0153, where it remains until the end of our sample.
The exact series is available from the authors by request.
Akerlof-Dickens-Perry  This variable is equal to 0.0230 from the beginning of our
productivity trend sample through 1973:4, then declines over nine quarters to a
value of 0.0100, where it remains through the rest of the sam-
ple. The values for the quarters 1974:1 through 1975:4 are
0.0216, 0.0201, 0.0187, 0.0172, 0.0158, 0.0144, 0.0129, and
0.0115.
Surveys of Consumers  The University of Michigan’s Survey Research Center, which
Inﬂation Expectations  conducts the Surveys of Consumers, asks its respondents how
series much they expect prices to go up or down on average during
the next twelve months. We use the median response to the
survey in the last month of the previous quarter as a measure
of inﬂationary expectations. Studies of this series suggest that
it provides the most accurate forecast of inﬂation one quarter
ahead. A complete survey description can be found at
http://athena.sca.isr.umich.edu/scripts/contents.asp.
Livingston Survey of  This survey was originally conducted by Joseph Livingston, a
Inﬂation Expectations journalist with the Philadelphia Inquirer, and has been contin-
ued by the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank since his death
in 1990. The survey is conducted every January and June and
asks respondents, who are professional economists, their fore-
cast for the level of the CPI six months hence. We use the
forecast of the inﬂation rate made in January for the second
and third quarters and the forecast made in June for the fourth
and following ﬁrst quarters. See http://www.phil.frb.
org/ﬁles/liv/document.html for a complete description of the
survey. 
Unemployment rate BLS ofﬁcial data on the total unemployment rate among the
nation’s labor force. Data were extracted from the BLS web-
site’s Selective Access page at http://www.bls.gov/webapps/
legacy/cpsatab9.htm.
George A. Akerlof, William T. Dickens, and George L. Perry 43
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Data series Source and description
Unemployment rate  BLS ofﬁcial data of the unemployment rate among men aged
for males aged 25–54 25–54 in the labor force. Data were extracted from the BLS
website’s Selective Access page at http://www.bls.gov/
webapps/legacy/cpsatab9.htm.
Shimer demographically  Robert Shimer’s demographically adjusted unemployment
adjusted unemployment   rate. For full details see Shimer (1998). Values for 1998:3
rate through 1999:4 are too recent to be in his series, so we took
the arithmetic average of the difference between the Shimer
series and the total unemployment rate from 1954 to 1998 and
added that to the total unemployment rate to arrive at values
for the Shimer series.
Guidepost dummy A dummy variable set equal to one from 1964:1 through
1966:2. This was used only in the split-sample regressions.
Wage and price controls  A dummy variable set equal to one from 1971:3 through
Phase One dummy 1972:4.
Wage and price controls  A dummy variable set equal to one from 1973:1 through
Phase Two and 1973  1974:1.
supply shocks dummy
Wage and price controls  A dummy variable set equal to one from 1974:2 through
removal dummy 1975:1.
1979 oil price shock  A dummy variable set equal to one from 1979:1 to 1980:1 and
dummy for 1981:1.
Price wedge The change in the total CPI-U minus the change in the CPI-U
less food and energy. Used as an alternative to the above dum-
mies in some of the split-sample regressions to account for
ﬂuctuations in food and energy prices. Data for both series
were extracted from the BLS website’s Selective Access page.
This variable was used only in the split-sample regressions.
44 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2000
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Discussion
Truman F. Bewley: I would like to interpret what this paper says in terms
of my own experience interviewing employers about wage and employ-
ment policies. The paper’s main assertion is that the perceived external rate
of wage inﬂation has less impact on a ﬁrm’s wage policy when the rate of
inflation is low than when it is high. I will suggest that there may be an
explanation of this phenomenon different from that given by the authors.
The phenomenon itself is, no doubt, real, given their persuasive empirical
results. However, the weak feedback of inflation on wages at low rates of
wage inﬂation may have an explanation involving the mechanics of wage
setting and may have little to do with near-rational behavior.
In order to present my explanation, I have to describe some things I
observed. The authors make the Keynesian assumption that morale
depends on the relationship between a ﬁrm’s wages and a reference wage,
which is roughly the average of wages of other firms competing in the
same labor market. I do not think this assumption is correct. Most employ-
ers that I have talked to say they think their workers have only a very vague
idea about pay rates outside their own firm. External pay rates therefore
have little impact on morale. This is especially true in nonunion com-
panies. Instead workers focus almost entirely on internal comparisons:
the wages they use as references are their own past pay and the pay of 
co-workers at the same workplace. Enough employees know each 
other’s pay that comparisons internal to a firm are an important compen-
sation issue, at least for workers who have long-term, full-time jobs. If pay
rates are internally inequitable, employees complain and morale falls
apart, causing management major problems. Past pay is an obvious refer-
ence, since everybody remembers his or her own compensation history.
45
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nal pay.
Because of the signiﬁcance of internal pay equity, ﬁrms normally have
a strict internal pay structure that relates pay to tenure on the job, to skill,
and to many other things, such as experience and job level. Internal struc-
tures vary in form from firm to firm. They are part of a firm’s culture and
must be followed rigorously if a firm is to remain healthy. The structure
may be described explicitly in a booklet, especially if the ﬁrm is large. This
document gives instructions to the managers who actually determine the
pay of individual workers. 
The relationship between the pay of different ﬁrms is the result of labor
market pressures. That is, the overall level of the pay structure is determined
by the ability to recruit and retain workers. Firms usually adjust the whole
level of their structure, moving pay rates at different levels in concert. 
It is very risky for a ﬁrm to cut the nominal pay of individual workers,
unless the firm is in danger of closing and its work force clearly under-
stands this danger. It may be possible, however, to reduce the nominal level
of the pay structure without cutting the pay of any worker. There is an
important distinction between the level of a pay structure and the level of
individual workers’ pay, a matter to which I will return. It may also be
risky to allow the purchasing power of workers’ pay to fall, although
reductions in the real value of pay have less serious consequences than do
nominal pay cuts. 
The choice of pay structure level is a strategic business decision dis-
cussed at high levels of management. In making this selection, business
leaders make use of labor market surveys and look at their own experi-
ence in recruiting and retaining workers. They also take account of the fact
that, if they raise the level of pay today, it will remain high in the future. 
I hear a lot about this last point now. I am currently surveying pricing
practices, and so I talk to businesspeople almost every day. Some say that
they are not now increasing pay to ease labor shortages, because they know
they will not be able to reverse the increases during the next economic
downturn.
It is important that, in setting pay levels, businesspeople look at wage
surveys. They buy surveys, make their own surveys, try to project rates of
wage inflation, and look at inflation as measured by the consumer price
index as an indicator of what other ﬁrms will do with regard to pay. They
also talk to competitors in the labor market and in the product market.
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without giving away information that would help other ﬁrms compete with
them in product markets. Employers need this information to be sure they
will pay enough to recruit and retain labor.
Because employers discuss wage setting among themselves, there may
not be a direct and mechanical feedback from projected wage increases
to wage policy, as the paper assumes. Through mutual consultation,
businesspeople can, I believe, coordinate a slowdown of wage increases.
I do not mean conscious coordination and am not implying collusion, but
they may create an atmosphere that decreases the size of the pay increases
perceived as needed. Such an ambience would be beyond the control of
any one ﬁrm, but would nevertheless be achieved. It is not clear how much
coordination occurs in this way, but businesses do keep each other
informed as to what they are doing with pay levels. 
I now turn to the distinction between the pay of individual workers and
the level of a pay structure. The former tends to increase over time,
because workers rise through the internal pay structure as they acquire
seniority, gain skills and experience, and become more valuable to the
company. Workers in unskilled jobs may hit a pay ceiling after two or three
years. But there are many skilled workers in the U.S. economy, and in
many firms these well-paid workers account for a large share of labor
costs. These workers may continue to rise in the pay structure throughout
their career.
Because most people are rising in the pay structure, they receive pay
increases every year even if the structure stays constant. If there is only a
little inflation in the cost of living, these increases might exceed that rate
of inflation. A company can even decrease its pay structure while giving
everybody real and nominal increases. 
A ﬁrm’s average cost of labor and its average and marginal cost of out-
put are determined by the level of the pay structure. Hence, if a ﬁrm gives
an average wage increase of 5 percent, it does not follow that its average
cost of labor rises by 5 percent. It may even decrease. The impact on the
average cost of labor depends on the steepness of the company’s internal
pay structure, on how fast employees rise within it, and on labor turnover.
The increase in the average cost of labor tends to be less than the pay
increase of an average worker because of what are called turnover savings.
These savings result from the fact that the average pay of workers enter-
ing a ﬁrm is less than the average pay of those leaving.
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trol labor costs. Stores offer a schedule of pay increases to floor staff to
provide work incentives, and these increases are paid for, to some extent,
by turnover savings. One of the disadvantages of economic downturns is
that they cause turnover to decrease, making existing staff steadily more
expensive. 
Firms have considerable latitude in choosing the level of their pay struc-
ture, for that choice is not a clear-cut decision but rather a judgment call. A
firm can allow its pay structure to lag behind that of other firms. It may
choose to do so if it is in trouble financially, if it considers that it can tol-
erate higher labor turnover or lower-quality employees, or if it believes
that its labor recruiters should work harder to find new workers. Social
mood may also affect the level of the pay structure, and I feel that this
mood has changed now from what it was during the recession of the early
1990s. Employers are talking tougher about pay now than they were then.
Whereas in the 1990s they talked about keeping up with other ﬁrms, now
they talk about avoiding excessive labor costs. This mood shift may help
explain why we have recently had such low inﬂation.
Imagine that a firm is holding its pay structure constant. A lot of the
firms whose managers I interviewed were doing just that. There may be
reasons for holding it constant despite recessionary conditions. A pay
structure’s level is ultimately tied to starting pay rates, and a ﬁrm that has
a reputation as a premier employer may think that potential employees
are aware of changes in starting rates. Such companies imagine that
declines in these rates would look bad. Other ﬁrms do not care. For exam-
ple, fast-food restaurants, supermarkets, and department stores allow start-
ing pay and hence the pay structure for floor staff to float up and down
freely with labor market conditions. 
Assuming that the pay structure remains constant, let us think about the
feedback from price inflation to the wage—not the feedback from wage
inﬂation, which is the subject of the paper. I am changing the topic some-
what. If price inﬂation is small, the ﬁrm may not be under any pressure to
raise wages to offset it, because most employees automatically receive
raises large enough to compensate for it. 
It might be imagined that, on the contrary, wage increases should equal
normal increases plus the rate of price inﬂation, no matter how small that
rate is, because inflation reduces the value of the normal increases and
hence reduces their impact on incentives. The incentive effects are, after
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internal structure. The reduction in the real value of the increases does
not seem, however, to have much impact on motivation, as long as the
real value of the increases remains positive. Employees think about their
increases relative to those of co-workers, so that the main impact on incen-
tives is achieved simply by rising within the internal pay structure. 
In summary, it could be that companies do not have to react at all to low
price inflation by increasing wages, because people are, in any case,
receiving annual increases that offset the inﬂation. Employees may react if
inflation is so high that living standards decline. But if living standards
do not decline, people do not suffer from the inﬂation and believe that the
normal increases reward their efforts adequately. 
Another reason for increasing the pay structure would be competition
for labor, and a firm may decide not to compete. I have talked to a num-
ber of managers lately about this topic in the context of the effects of
capacity constraints on prices. When I ask about capacity, a typical
response is, “Our capacity limitation is labor. We can’t operate a third
shift, because we can’t get the workers.” 
“So why don’t you raise wages to attract more labor?”
“Well, sure, we could raise wages, but it wouldn’t do much good. There
is not enough labor out there.” 
That is one argument. Another is, “We don’t want to get stuck with high
pay.”
This is the kind of strategic thinking that goes into determining the level
of a pay structure. Although in today’s low-inflation environment the pri-
mary consideration is not the general rate of price inflation, the situation
would probably change if price inflation were high enough to exceed the
rate of pay increase that most people enjoy as a result of rising through
the pay structure. In that case, people’s living standards would decline, and
when living standards fall, people cannot afford the things they have
grown used to, and they become angry with their company. Business exec-
utives take such reactions seriously. When wages are increased to com-
pensate for price inflation, the pay structure rises, and with it the firm’s
marginal costs of output. 
Thus, labor turnover and the internal pay hierarchy create a distinction
between the increase in the average cost of labor to a ﬁrm and the increase
in the average pay of individual workers. And the choice of the level of a
firm’s pay structure is dominated by competition for labor, except when
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tures just to protect employee living standards. Living standards tend not
to be an important factor at low rates of inﬂation, because the living stan-
dards of many or most workers are protected by the raises that they would
receive even if there were no inﬂation. These points give another possible
explanation for the paper’s observation that the sensitivity of wages to
inﬂation increases with the rate of inﬂation. 
Alan S. Blinder: This is a throwback paper. I say that without disparage-
ment, however. After all, the Phillips curve was published in the year of my
bar mitzvah. George Akerlof, William Dickens, and George Perry (hence-
forth ADP) offer us a fascinating and skillfully executed paper, and the fact
that it is decidedly old-fashioned does not mean that it is wrong. The
authors’ objective is to bring money illusion back to the Phillips curve,
from whence it was banished decades ago. To put their latest effort into
historical perspective, I ask you to remember The Lone Ranger and “return
with me now to those thrilling days of yesteryear.” Money illusion rides
again.
The shape of the Phillips curve. The original Phillips curve, as pre-
sented by A. W. Phillips and Richard Lipsey,
1 took the form  w • = f(U) + aπ.
If we give the inﬂation term on the right-hand side an expectational inter-
pretation and append a ﬁxed markup, this gives rise to the usual price-price
Phillips curve, which is sloping in both the short and the long run.
Subsequently, Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps pointed out that such
equations embody money illusion if a < 1: each 1 percent increase in inﬂa-
tion raises w • by only a percent and hence reduces real wage gains.
2 This,
they pointed out, is fundamentally illogical. The parameter amust be exactly
1.0, which makes the long-run Phillips curve vertical at the natural rate.
In their paper, ADP embody money illusion in the Phillips curve when
inflation is low, but not when it is high; this leads to the curve shown in
their ﬁgure 1. Its odd shape comes from the following reasoning.
First, remember that we are looking at a long-run Phillips curve here, so
we are tracing out alternative steady states. Start at zero inflation. Since
there can be no money illusion when inflation is zero, unemployment is
at the natural rate. At modest inﬂation rates, money illusion kicks in, mak-
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have put it) raising the money supply in wage units. In the negatively
sloped portion of the curve, higher inﬂation leads to more money illusion
and therefore to lower unemployment, just as in an old-fashioned Phillips
curve. But at even higher inﬂation rates, more and more workers and ﬁrms
shake off their money illusion, and the economy relinquishes these
employment gains. At high enough inﬂation rates (roughly above 6 percent
in the authors’ illustrative figure), all money illusion is gone and the
Phillips curve is vertical for the usual reasons.
Now compare this Phillips curve with the one the authors offered in
their earlier Brookings Paper (henceforth ADP-I).
3The two carry quite dif-
ferent empirical and policy implications at low inflation rates. ADP-I
warned us that low inﬂation could be catastrophic because of the zero ﬂoor
on nominal wage increases. Their Phillips curve veered sharply to the
right, toward extremely high unemployment rates, as inflation fell to low
levels. ADP-II argues, in stark contrast, that some low, positive inflation
rate will lead to minimal unemployment—that is, unemployment below
the natural rate and, indeed, stunningly below it in some speciﬁcations.
At least superficially, U.S. data since 1996 seem far more consistent
with ADP-II than with ADP-I, which, I suppose, is why ADP-II was writ-
ten. The authors are entirely correct to point out that the mechanisms of the
two papers—nominal wage floors in ADP-I and money illusion in 
ADP-II—are not inconsistent. In fact, they are ﬁrst cousins: one can meld
them into a single model. But the contrast between the Phillips curves in 
ADP-I and ADP-II raises an important practical question for the Federal
Reserve: should it welcome, or shun, inflation in the range of, say, 
2 percent?
To pursue this question, I will concentrate on an important property of
the Phillips curve that ADP emphasize in this paper. The leftmost point in
their figure 1 represents the lowest rate of unemployment that is sustain-
able and the inflation rate that accompanies it. I would like to raise two
questions about this point: Is it optimal? And is it sustainable?
The answer to the first question is, obviously not. The ADP model
allows for no explicit costs of inflation. Were any such costs of inflation
added to the model, the optimal point would be one with lower inflation
and higher unemployment than the leftmost point in ﬁgure 1.
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school” critic on the Brookings Panel, let me assume that role for a
moment. We Chicago types hasten to remind the authors that money illu-
sion is an error: reacting to nominal magnitudes as if they were real
magnitudes is a mistake that leads to bad decisions. ADP do not offer any
utility analysis of labor supply. But if they did, it would presumably show
that utility declines because people work too much given the low level of
real wages. (In fairness, this utility loss will be small.)
Who’s got the money illusion? What about sustainability? Here, once
again, I find it useful to go back to “those thrilling days of yesteryear”
and remember some old-time Keynesian economics.
We old-timers used to tell our young charges that the distinguishing
theoretical feature of Keynesian economics was nominal wage rigidity.
That assumption, in turn, combined two distinct notions: first, that the
labor market is characterized by downward wage rigidity rather than mar-
ket clearing, and second, that nominal, not real, wages are rigid (because
of money illusion). I used to pose the following question to my students:
Which assumption produces the characteristic Keynesian policy result that
raising aggregate demand will boost employment? The answer is, the
second. If it is real wages that are rigid, the model generates classical
unemployment that cannot be cured by expanding demand. On the other
hand, if the labor market clears, but with money illusion in the labor
supply function, higher aggregate demand raises the price level, shifts the
labor supply curve outward, and boosts employment. This conclusion is so
old that it may seem new to young economists, many of whom have never
been exposed to such archaic musings.
Why did Keynes assume that workers suffered from money illusion?
Although he never lived to read Kahneman and Tversky, Keynes’s “evi-
dence” was not so different from ADP’s. He wrote:
Now ordinary experience tells us, beyond doubt, that a situation where labour
stipulates (within limits) for a money-wage rather than a real wage, so far from
being a mere possibility, is the normal case. . . . It is sometimes said that it would
be illogical for labour to resist a reduction on money-wages but not to resist a
reduction of real wages. . . . But, whether logical or illogical, experience shows
that this is in fact how labour behaves.4
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first is to raise a question: Who has the money illusion? ADP tell their
readers it does not matter: as long as one side of the wage bargain has
money illusion, it all comes out the same. They write, “A whole spectrum
of other models in which various combinations of firms and workers
ignore or underweight inflation in their mental frames will yield similar
results.” Their specific model takes up the case in which firms, not work-
ers, are “near rational.” But if labor demand is a decreasing function of
the real wage, it seems to me that ﬁrms plagued by money illusion would
underdeflate the money wage, and hence behave as if the real wage were
higher than it actually is. If the labor demand schedule is downward slop-
ing,
5 such firms will hire less labor than in the neoclassical equilibrium,
not more.
6
Second, we old-fashioned Keynesians used to argue that money illu-
sion, being a clear departure from rationality, should disappear over time.
Thus the money illusion that characterizes the short run should not persist
into the long run. In Phillips curve terms, this leads to a familiar conclu-
sion: the Phillips curve is negatively sloped in the short run, but vertical
in the long run. ADP, by contrast, offer figure 1 as their long-run Phillips
curve.
These two views carry quite different policy implications. In the ADP
view, money illusion will last forever as long as inflation is modest. Thus
the leftmost point in their ﬁgure 1, with its super-low unemployment rate,
can persist indeﬁnitely. In the post-Friedman-Phelps Keynesian view, how-
ever, money illusion will not last forever.
ADP use a variety of psychological evidence (including a quote from
me—dirty pool!) to argue instead that higher inflation, not the passage
of time, dissipates money illusion. I have not the slightest objection to
their psychologically based notion that higher inflation rates are more
salient, are less likely to be edited out of the worry lists of harried deci-
sionmakers, and so forth. But doesn’t time matter, too? As long as the
economy remains in the range where money illusion is operational, real
wages in the near-rational sector remain lower than in the rational sector.
George A. Akerlof, William T. Dickens, and George L. Perry 53
5. The ADP model contains no condition analogous to the neoclassical equilibrium:
real wage = marginal product of labor.
6. An exception arises if labor supply is totally inelastic. In that case, employment is
unaffected.
9573—02 BPEA Akerlo/Dickens/Per  7/21/00 10:18  Page 53Eventually, workers should catch on to the fact that their neighbors are
earning more, even if only a little more.
The evidence for money illusion. Of course, my pretending to be a
Chicago economist was just playacting. In fact, I am persuadable—indeed,
pretty much persuaded—that money illusion is a fact of life. But I do
want to enter a couple of objections to the evidence that ADP offer in its
defense.
They suggest a “decision heuristic” whereby inflation is “averaged
along with other factors to arrive at a nominal wage or price increase.”
Maybe I am trapped inside a rationality box, but this does not make sense
to me. What “other factors” are in this average? Productivity improve-
ments? Demand pressures? As determinants of nominal wage increments,
shouldn’t these factors be added, not averaged? It seems to me that infla-
tion is a factor unlike any other. Because it is fundamentally about adjust-
ing units of measurement, it is something one adds on to the basic deter-
minants of real wages. Besides, if we are averaging factors that contribute
to higher wages, shouldn’t the other factors, like productivity, also be
attenuated?
Second, the authors observe that compensation professionals caution
ﬁrms not to grant automatic cost-of-living adjustments. That may be true,
but it is not evidence for money illusion. Suppose the ﬁrm raises its salary
pool by inﬂation plus a small increment for productivity gains. That would
be an illusion-free outcome. Still, the firm would not want to give every
worker the same percentage raise, because that would destroy its ability
to reward superior performance—that is, to adjust relative wages.
Finally, let me suggest a potential cognitive error that cuts in the other
direction. The Bureau of Labor Statistics adjusts various prices for qual-
ity improvements, and for good reasons. But ordinary consumers, being
less sophisticated than Jack Triplett or Robert Gordon, may see higher
prices as higher prices. So, for example, most people think automobile
prices have soared over the last two decades. But the BLS disagrees: after
accounting for large quality adjustments, new car prices have risen much
slower than the overall rate of inflation. And everyone knows that com-
puters have fallen in price. But how many people think they now cost only
6 percent of what they did in 1981? Yet that is what Dale Jorgenson and
Kevin Stiroh imply in their paper in this issue. As a ﬁnal example, is there
anyone who doesn’t believe that medical care prices have skyrocketed,
even though some excellent recent research suggests that many quality-
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money illusion will overweight inﬂation, not underweight it.
The last word. I hasten to add that I find much to admire in this paper,
especially the authors’ thorough and creative empirical work, which
includes myriad robustness checks. I was especially pleased to find the
Sargent critique addressed by the use of directly observed expectational
data. Such an approach is no panacea, but it is certainly a step in the right
direction.
Finally, even if one harbors doubts about the details of the ADP model,
as I do, the theory calls attention to an interesting hypothesis that is well
worth exploring in its own right, namely, that the coefficient on expected
inﬂation in the Phillips curve depends on past inﬂation. The authors could
have skipped all the theory, appealed to the psychological evidence, and
jumped directly to that testable hypothesis. To test it, however, one needs
a way to constrain the coefﬁcient to range between zero and one. Using a
probability distribution function is a clever way to accomplish that. And so
far, the tests look pretty favorable. Now that, kemo sabe, is something the
Fed really should know.
General discussion: Benjamin Friedman expanded on Alan Blinder’s
comment about whether the point that maximized the sustainable employ-
ment rate should be considered the optimal point at which to operate the
economy. He pointed out that, even if one accepts the standard macroeco-
nomic argument that zero inﬂation minimizes various distortion costs and
that the losses from these costs are quadratic, then given the higher
employment that a positive inflation rate makes possible in the authors’
model, the optimal inﬂation rate is above zero even after accounting for the
associated distortions. Friedman also noted that other recent empirical
work had cast doubt on the idea of a vertical long-run Phillips curve, and
he saw the paper as both confirming those results and providing a theo-
retical underpinning for them. He observed that the paper is consistent
with the recent literature that ﬁnds, for the United States and other OECD
countries, that many aspects of the real economy are not invariant to the
inﬂation rate.
Edmund Phelps interpreted the paper as showing that declining inﬂation
accounted for the decline in U.S. unemployment. He noted that he and
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such as real interest rates and changing productivity trends, were important
in explaining the divergence in unemployment rates across OECD coun-
tries in the 1990s. Once these factors were accounted for, inflation was not
important. He wondered whether the model of this paper would hold up
if real variables were given a chance to explain the data. William Dickens
responded that the Brainard-Perry results suggest that it is the change in
the coefficient on inflation that is driving changes in the sustainable rate of
unemployment, not changes in the intercept, as would be the case if the
factors Phelps cited were responsible for the improvement.
Robert Gordon recalled James Stock’s observation that the real puzzle
in today’s economy might be low unemployment rather than low inflation.
This perspective draws attention to the fact that some alternative mea-
sures of resource utilization, such as capacity utilization in manufacturing,
are not tight. It also draws attention to a number of structural factors relat-
ing to the labor market, such as those examined by Lawrence Katz and
Alan Krueger in the Spring 1999 issue of Brookings Papers, which the
present authors did not consider. Responding to Phelps’s and Gordon’s
observations that real variables and labor market changes had not been
taken into account, George Perry noted that productivity was in the equa-
tions and that demographic changes were allowed for by using alternative
unemployment measures.
William Nordhaus suggested that the issue of the costs of inﬂation went
beyond tax distortions and shoe leather costs, and involved how people mis-
perceive inflation. He recalled a point made by Henry Wallich at a time
when the division of labor in most households fell along then-traditional
lines. Wallich had observed that inflation was sexist: the husband liked it
because his wages were rising rapidly, but the wife disliked it because the
prices she had to pay at the grocery store were rising rapidly. The persis-
tent irrationality in the conﬂicting views of economic agents as producers
and the same economic agents as consumersbelongs in any analysis of the
cost of inflation. Nordhaus also suggested that the authors test whether
inﬂationary expectations in fact have responded to experienced inﬂation in
the nonlinear way suggested by the paper. Such a response would imply
that the elasticity of inflationary expectations to inflation was low at low
inflation rates, then rose above one as inflation rose, and settled at one at
sufficiently high inflation rates. While recognizing that the model under-
pinning this paper had the response to expectations, rather than the expec-
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model was worth examining.
Olivier Blanchard observed that both the changing prevalence of cost-
of-living clauses in wage contracts and the characteristics of such clauses
supported the authors’model of how inﬂation entered into decisions. Such
clauses typically kick in only above a certain threshold, with no adjustment
made at low inflation rates, and the fraction of contracts that are indexed
varies directly with the inﬂation rate. During the high-inﬂation period, two
explanations were offered for this changing fraction. One was that certain
ﬁxed costs associated with understanding the point of indexation had to be
overcome, and the other was that incentives for indexation are high only
when inflation is high. The fact that that the proportion of indexed con-
tracts declined after inflation fell supports the second explanation, which
is consistent with the model.
Despite being skeptical of the econometrics, Christopher Sims found
the model and its implications plausible. His own work led him to believe
that agents react in nonlinear fashion to shocks, with small shocks eliciting
weak reactions and large shocks eliciting strong ones. He had modeled
the idea that the reactions of individuals to stochastic signals, like prices or
wages, involve a finite rate of information flow, using this as a constraint
on dynamic optimizing behavior. This implies that individuals react slug-
gishly to market signals, with their reactions delayed and smoothed, or
made at discrete intervals, introducing idiosyncratic error. The extent of
such processing depends on how important the signal is.
Sims suggested that this work provides a further theoretical justiﬁcation
for the kind of results the authors obtain, but in addition provides a ratio-
nale for a broader pattern of results that emerges in the literature on vec-
tor autoregressive analyses. Its findings contradict the notion that some
variables are inherently costly to move. Shocks typically affect own vari-
ables quickly, whereas cross-variable relationships show slow, smooth
reactions. In closing, Sims suggested that this work implies a modification
of the Lucas critique: perhaps what matters is not whether a policy action
is predictable, but how important it is. This would make it possible to
have apparently permanent sluggish responses when policy is stable and
shocks are small.
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